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A CASE STUDY ON GERMANY’S AVIATION TAX USING THE SYNTHETIC 
CONTROL APPROACH  
Daniel Borbely 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, 199 Cathedral Street, G4 0QU, 
Glasgow, United Kingdom   
 
Abstract: The German Aviation Tax is a tax levied on departing passengers from German 
airports. In this paper, we investigate the impact Germany’s aviation tax has had on passenger 
numbers using the synthetic control method to generate counterfactual passenger numbers for 
German airports, and for airports outside Germany but near the German border. The results 
are consistent with passengers engaging in cross-border substitution in response to the 
aviation tax. Most tax exempt airports near German borders have made sizeable gains in 
passenger numbers since Germany introduced its aviation tax. Within Germany there appears 
to be a clear distinction in the impact on small/regional airports and that on larger hubs. From 
a policy perspective, the finding of a cross-border substitution effect implies that the aviation 
tax might not be effective in curbing overall emissions from air travel, whilst also leading to 
lost tax revenues through the displacement of passengers to neighbouring countries.  
JEL Classification: H26, H30, L93  
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1. Introduction  
 
Aviation tax (AT) regimes in Europe receive considerable attention. Germany’s AT was 
introduced on 1st January 2011 and remains payable on departures from all German airports 
at a cost of €7.50, €22.43, or €42.18 depending on the distance flown1. While often motivated 
as environmental taxes, the common perception is that revenue raising is the key driver of 
ATs (Zuidberg 2015). In spite of this, experts often question the efficacy of single-country 
ATs as environmental measures or revenue-raising tools, in large part due to the cross-border 
tax avoidance opportunities associated with them (Zuidberg 2015, Krenek and 
Schratzenstaller 2017). Airports and airlines often spearhead campaigns for abolition of ATs, 
citing adverse effects on demand, competitiveness and connectivity2. Germany’s Economy 
Minister is reportedly swaying toward abolition for these reasons3.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact that Germany’s AT has had on passenger numbers 
using German airports and airports outside Germany but near the border (henceforth referred 
to as bordering airports). Specifically, we use the synthetic control method of Abadie et al. 
(2010) to construct counterfactual series for each airport of interest, the counterfactual series 
representing passenger numbers under the alternative scenario that AT was never introduced. 
The impact of AT is then estimated as the gap between actual passenger numbers since 2011 
and the counterfactual numbers.  
We estimate changes in passenger numbers that can be attributed to AT for German airports 
and for bordering airports outside of Germany. Airports are modelled separately to see 
whether the effects of the AT might differ across airport types. Results indicate more 
passengers used bordering airports after the introduction of German AT, while most German 
airports, with the exception of hubs, saw a negative impact of AT on passenger numbers.  
Our main contribution is to the literature on the impacts of AT. Case studies focusing on the 
Dutch AT (introduced in 2008 and abolished a year later) find that the aviation tax led to a 
significant reduction in passenger numbers at Dutch airports, an increase in passengers at 
airports in bordering countries (Gordijn and Kolkman 2011), and a reduction in tourism 
(Mayor and Tol 2010). For the United Kingdom, Seetaram et al. (2014) find that the UK 
aviation tax (Air Passenger Duty, or APD) was ineffective in reducing demand for air travel 
                                                             
1 See Deutsche Bundesregierung (German Federal Government, 2012).  
2 See Edinburgh Airport (2015). 
3 See DW “German Air Passenger Tax Under Increased Fire” August 2017. 
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and passengers were prepared to pay higher prices for flight tickets. Similarly, Mayor and Tol 
(2007) find that doubling the UK aviation tax did not lead to a reduction in demand, only a 
substitution from short-haul to long-haul flights. For Australia, Forsyth et al. (2014) estimates 
that the introduction of the aviation tax will lead to sizable net losses to the tourism industry. 
Finally, contemporaneously to our study, Falk and Hagsten (2018) assess the impacts of the 
recently introduced AT in Germany and Austria on passenger numbers at both domestic and 
bordering airports. They use a panel data difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) approach 
with untaxed European airports as the comparison (control) group in order to estimate the 
effects of AT on passenger numbers. They also distinguish between hubs, low-cost and 
bordering airports: their main finding is that the AT led to an overall reduction in passenger 
numbers at Austrian and German airports, but that these results are mostly driven by airports 
that predominantly serve low-cost airlines. They find no significant impact from the AT on 
passenger numbers at bordering airports.  
Case studies that have assessed the impacts of ATs on passenger numbers have either used a 
linear extrapolation method (Gordjin and Kolkman 2011) or panel diff-in-diff (Falk and 
Hagsten 2018) to estimate counterfactual passenger numbers at airports, where the 
counterfactual approximates passenger numbers under a scenario of no aviation tax. Through 
our empirical strategy, we contribute to the literature by employing a novel approach to 
estimate counterfactual passenger numbers at airports. Our empirical approach uses the 
synthetic control method (Abadie et al. 2010) to estimate counterfactual passenger numbers, 
and can provide robust estimates of counterfactuals for a number of reasons. First, this 
method optimises the selection of comparison (control) airports so that counterfactual 
passenger numbers are based on those control airports most similar to the treated airports in 
terms of passenger trends. Second, contrary to panel diff-in-diff estimations, synthetic control 
estimates do not rely on the assumption of parallel trends for treated and control groups 
(Billmeier and Nannicini 2013). This approach is particularly suitable for our analysis as it 
allows us to construct reliable counterfactuals using aggregate level data. Indeed, according 
to Abadie et al. (2015) the most relevant application of the synthetic control method is for 
comparative case studies that use aggregate data.   
Through our findings we also contribute to the literature on the determinants of air passenger 
demand and airport choice (see for example Graham 2000, Brons et al. 2002, Valdes 2015, or 
Jankiewicz and Huderek-Glapska 2016). Only a few studies (Pels et al. 1998, Steverink and 
van Daalen 2011) consider the impact that aviation taxes have on the airport choices of 
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passengers. These studies are however mostly theoretical in their approach. Our paper 
therefore contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that passengers are 
highly responsive to the introduction of AT, and by finding some evidence (albeit only at the 
aggregate level) that passengers change airport choices in response to these taxes.  
Furthermore, our analysis contributes to the literature on cross-border shopping (Joossens and 
Raw 1995, Nielsen 2001, Asplund et al. 2007). This strand of the tax policy literature focuses 
on the way tax differences across borders affect the preferences and choices of consumers. 
Our results contribute to the literature by finding evidence for a specific case of cross-border 
shopping: our results show that AT differences across borders can have a noticeable impact 
on air passenger movements between the bordering countries. More specifically, we find that 
the introduction of the AT in Germany can be associated with a substantial increase in 
passengers at tax-free airports near the German border.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant 
conceptual and policy background. Section 3 describes the data and outlines the empirical 
approach. Section 4 shows the results and assesses the plausibility of our findings. Section 5 
provides a discussion of our findings. Section 6 concludes.  
  
5 
 
2. Conceptual and Policy Background   
 
The German aviation tax (AT) was introduced on 1st January, 2011. The AT is charged after 
passengers departing from German airports. There are three different tax bands charged based 
on distance flown with rates set at €7.50, €22.43, and €42.18 for short, medium, and long-
distance flights, respectively4. According to forecasts by Berster et al. (2010), the number of 
passengers expected to belong to each tax category was (at the time of introduction) 62.3, 2.9, 
and 8.9 million, respectively.  
We estimate that roughly 84% of passengers can be expected to pay a unit tax of €7.50, 4% 
of passengers can be expected to pay €22.43, and 12% of passengers can be expected to pay 
€42.185. Consequently, passengers on short and long-distance flights contribute the vast 
majority of tax revenues from AT. The average passenger departing from a German airport 
faced a tax increase of €12.266.  
The introduction of AT was justified as an environmental measure, however, experts believe 
that the German government’s main objective with the tax was to consolidate its budget (see 
Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2017)7. The government’s initial expectation was to raise €1 
billion annually from AT (Berster et al. 2010, Steppler 2011). Upon the introduction of the 
tax, some experts warned (see Steppler 2011) that the German AT was likely to have the 
same adverse effect on passenger numbers that had been experienced following the 
introduction of the Dutch version of the tax a few years earlier. The AT remains controversial 
to this day with frequent calls for its abolition by industry participants and policy makers.  
Aviation taxes may impact both the supply (airlines’ supply of flights, destinations, and 
frequencies) and the demand (passengers’ demand for airline services) side of the aviation 
industry. On the supply side, upon the implementation of AT, airlines initially decide to what 
extent they should pass the cost of these taxes to passengers: their choice is whether to keep 
ticket prices constant (and absorb the tax themselves) or pass on the tax in the form of higher 
ticket prices. This decision largely depends on market conditions and the type of strategy 
                                                             
4 See German Aviation Tax Act 2011 and Deutsche Bundesregierung (2012).  
5 Unfortunately no data are available to estimate these numbers for all of our sample years. The estimation 
above is based on 2008 data from Berster et al. (2010).  
6 This is the weighted average of the unit taxes considering the shares of passengers traveling under each 
distance band.  
7 In the German Aviation Tax Act 2011, it is stated that AT should “provide an incentive for behaviour which is 
more appropriate to the needs of the environment”.   
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airlines employ (Zuidberg 2015): profit-maximising airlines are more likely to pass taxes on 
in comparison with growth-maximizing airlines (these will likely absorb the tax to maintain 
traffic).  
Airlines might also adjust their networks in response to the introduction of aviation taxes. 
They might choose to serve different airports and provide lower flight frequencies at certain 
airports (Zuidberg 2015). These adjustments are more likely to be made by low-cost airlines 
as these airlines are more flexible, and can move airports at relative ease in comparison to 
traditional carrier airlines as their operations are not tied to large hub airports (Thelle and la 
Cour Sonne 2017). For this reason, in the case of the German AT, ceteris paribus, we should 
expect larger responses to aviation taxes at smaller regional airports that predominantly serve 
low-cost airlines than at large hubs. According to Zuidberg (2015) after the implementation 
of the German AT, the low-cost carrier Ryanair announced that it would cut capacity at a 
number of German regional airports (for example Bremen or Frankfurt Hahn) it used for its 
operations, supply side responses of this kind will likely also impact on passenger demand at 
these airports.  
The network adjustment responses of airlines will be partly in anticipation of (or in response 
to) changes in passenger demand in response to the tax changes (assuming at least some level 
of pass-through). Changes in passenger demand in response to AT will largely depend on the 
price elasticity of demand. Price elasticities for air travel might be highly heterogeneous 
across consumer groups, airports and types of travel (see for example Brons et al. 2002 or 
Hofer et al. 2008). Specifically, short-haul and leisure passengers are likely to be more 
sensitive to price changes than long-haul and business passengers (Brons et al. 2002, Hess 
and Polak 2005, Morlotti et al. 2017). Short-haul passengers might be more price sensitive 
due to the ease with which they can substitute to other forms of transportation (cars, railway). 
Once again, short-haul and leisure passengers are likely to provide a large percentage of the 
traffic at smaller regional airports, while there should be more long-haul and business 
passengers at hubs, so we should expect a larger demand side response to AT at small 
regional airports and a lesser response at hubs.  
Another possible substitution response by passengers is to start using nearby airports in 
bordering countries where no aviation tax is in place. In the case of the Dutch AT there is 
some evidence that the aviation tax prompted Dutch passengers to substitute to nearby 
German and Belgian airports (Gordijn and Kolkman 2011). It is also likely that airlines 
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respond to this substitution effect by adjusting their network and relocating some services to 
AT exempt bordering airports. In the German AT case, we would expect that the presence of 
viable AT exempt airports near the German border (for example Eindhoven, Charleroi, 
Luxembourg or Basel) would induce a substitution effect (even though Falk and Hagsten 
(2018) found no significant evidence of this in their analysis). The leakage of air passengers 
induced by the substitution to bordering airports might also be problematic for governments 
from a policy perspective: it leads to lower tax revenues but does not significantly reduce the 
overall number of air passengers, so no improvement in environmental outcomes can be 
claimed.   
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3. Data and Identification Strategy   
 
We assess the impact of the German AT on passenger numbers by estimating counterfactual 
series of passenger numbers for each treated airport – the counterfactual numbers correspond 
to a scenario where no AT was introduced. The choice of ‘treated’ airports, for which we 
believe AT may have had an impact, are German international airports and bordering airports 
(located outside Germany but within two hours driving time). Our calculations for driving 
time are based on Google Maps data. Our choice of catchment area is based on the likely cost 
considerations of passengers: per passenger fuel costs for a two-hour car journey on a 
motorway near German border regions are similar in value (according to Journey Price 
Calculator) to the average tax savings from avoiding AT. The choice of catchment area only 
affects our selection of possible ‘treated’ bordering airports and has no impact on estimations 
for other airports. Including bordering airports in the analysis allows us to investigate 
potential spill-over effects from AT. Treated airports are shown in Figure 1 along with an 
indication of catchment area, represented by a circle with a radius of 150km (corresponding 
to approximately two hours of driving time). Blue dots represent airports excluded due to 
data/model limitations. Our sample includes 21 treated airports in Germany, and 13 treated 
airports near the German border (but outside of Germany). To assess why AT might have had 
a different impact at some airports in comparison to others, we estimate separate models for 
each airport. For treated airports, we compare actual (observed) passenger numbers to 
counterfactual ones after the introduction of AT to assess the impact of the tax.  
 
3.1 Synthetic control method  
 
To estimate counterfactual passenger numbers, we use the synthetic control method (Abadie 
et al. 2010, 2015). The synthetic control method constructs counterfactuals (also referred to 
as synthetic controls) using a weighted average of ‘control’ airports. Control airports are 
airports where no changes in AT took place during our sample period8. Formally, the 
synthetic control method as applied to the German AT case can be described as follows.  
                                                             
8 Information on aviation tax regimes is from EBAA, A Snapshot of European Aviation Taxes, September 2015. 
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Let 𝐽 be the number of airports in our sample, where 𝑗 = 1 is a specific treated airport. In 
order to allow for a meaningful comparison, the sample 𝐽 contains airports similar in 
characteristics to the treated airport (see Section 3.2 below for more detail).  
The airports (𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽) are included in the group of possible control airports. The 
counterfactual (synthetic control) is a weighted average of control airports and can be 
represented as a (𝐽𝑥1) vector of weights 𝑊 = (𝑤2 , … , 𝑤𝐽−1), where 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽−1 = 1 
and 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 < 1.  
Furthermore, let 𝑋𝑇 be a (𝑘𝑥1) vector containing the values of pre-AT characteristics of the 
treated airport, and let 𝑋𝐶 be a (𝑘𝑥𝐽) matrix containing values for the same characteristics for 
control airports. These characteristics include predictors of passenger numbers (covariates 
such as regional purchasing power or flight ticket price inflation) and also pre-AT passenger 
numbers at airports. We would like to match treated and control airports based on the values 
of predictors so that our counterfactual best resembles the treated airport in terms of pre-AT 
characteristics. The difference in pre-AT characteristics between the treated airport and the 
counterfactual is equal to 𝑋𝑇 − 𝑋𝐶𝑊. The optimal counterfactual 𝑊
∗ (a weighted average of 
control airports) selected through the synthetic control procedure is the one that minimises 
the size of this difference.  
Applying 𝑊∗ to post-AT passenger numbers then gives the counterfactual passenger 
number 𝑃𝐶𝑊
∗, which is equal to passenger numbers at selected control airports multiplied by 
their optimal weights. The effect of AT on passenger numbers at the treated airport is then 
given by 𝑃𝑇 − 𝑃𝐶𝑊
∗, that is, the post-AT difference between actual passenger numbers at the 
treated airport (𝑃𝑇) and counterfactual estimates (𝑃𝐶𝑊
∗).  
In summary, the synthetic control method chooses control weights so that pre-AT passenger 
numbers and covariate (predictors) values for the counterfactual are similar (on average) to 
those at the treated airport. The covariates also control for variation arising from other factors 
that affect passenger numbers (regional and macroeconomic variables). The synthetic control 
approach therefore optimises the selection of control airports: to construct counterfactual 
passenger numbers the procedure finds the convex combination of control airports that 
provide the ‘best fit’, that is, the fit between passenger numbers at treated airports and their 
synthetic control, pre-AT.  
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As mentioned above, in this paper we construct counterfactuals using separate synthetic 
control estimations for each treated airport9. For these airports, we then compare actual 
passenger numbers to counterfactual ones after the introduction of AT to assess the impact of 
the tax. 
According to Abadie et al. (2015) synthetic control should be used only when there is a 
sufficiently large number of pre-treatment periods for the optimisation of the control unit 
selection. While the number of pre-treatment periods we have in our analysis (eight) is 
certainly not large, there is no precise recommendation for the number of pre-treatment 
periods, and several recent examples of research using synthetic control used fewer pre-
treatment periods (for example Munasib and Richman 2014, Zhang et al. 2016, or Chamon et 
al. 2017) 10.  
The synthetic control approach is similar to the panel diff-in-diff methodology often used for 
policy evaluations and also employed in Falk and Hagsten (2018) for their analysis of the 
impact of Austrian and German AT. We believe however that the synthetic control approach 
has some notable advantages over panel-diff-in-diff in the context of the present analysis.  
First, synthetic control relies on considerably weaker identifying assumptions in comparison 
to panel diff-in-diff methods (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013). In particular, panel diff-in-diff 
estimations rely on the assumption of parallel trends in outcomes for treated and control 
units. In our example, under this assumption, passenger numbers at treated (taxed) airports 
would have to follow the same pre-AT trends as control (untaxed) airports - post-AT 
differences in passenger numbers could then be contributed to the presence of AT. For the 
German AT case, this assumption is difficult to validate due to the high degree of 
heterogeneity in passenger trends across different airports: passenger numbers are determined 
by a number of factors and conditions (see Hess and Polak 2005) and it might not be safe to 
assume that all differences (even conditional on covariates) between treated and control 
airports are a result of tax changes. On the other hand, synthetic control does not rely on the 
assumption of parallel trends as it optimises control airport selection on the basis of pre-AT 
fit in passenger trends between treated and control airports.  
                                                             
9 Synthetic control estimations in this paper are implemented using the ‘synth’ package in Stata.  
10 We are unable to use earlier data on our sample airports as passenger data are not consistently available before 
2003. For example, Eurostat only has data on passenger numbers at German airports from 2003 onwards.  
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Another advantage of synthetic control in comparison to panel diff-in-diff is that it can 
account for the presence of time-varying unobservable confounders (Billmeier and Nannicini 
2013). This provides a good way to minimise the possibility of omitted variable bias and 
control for the fact that some shocks (captured by our covariates) to passenger numbers might 
not occur until after the introduction of AT.  
There are limitations to the synthetic control approach that must be considered when applying 
this method. First, synthetic control relies on balanced panel data, as the process of estimating 
the counterfactual requires units to be observed in all time periods (Abadie et al. 2015). In the 
context of this paper, this data requirement is met as we use time-series data on passenger 
numbers from a balanced panel of European airports in our empirical analysis below. Second, 
synthetic control estimates may be biased by idiosyncratic shocks to the outcome variable 
that control units and covariates are unable to capture (Abadie et al. 2015). In the case of 
German AT, estimates may be biased due to idiosyncratic country, or airport, specific shocks 
to passenger numbers at German airports. Examples of such shocks to passenger numbers 
could include terrorist attacks, natural disasters and/or major sporting events. In the context 
of this paper, a notable concern is that the impact of the 2006 FIFA World Cup, and 
particularly its final in Berlin, on passenger numbers might interfere with our counterfactual 
estimations. To ensure that we do not draw conclusions based on biased estimates, we check 
the validity of our counterfactuals through several sensitivity checks which are presented in 
Section 4 below. Finally, another limitation of the synthetic control approach is that it does 
not allow for large-sample asymptotic inference of estimates (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013). 
Nonetheless, inferences can be made using placebo and robustness tests (Abadie et al. 2010) 
which are reported in Section 4 of this paper.  
 
3.2 Control airport selection 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we estimate separate synthetic control models for each treated 
airport. This is done in order to 1) optimise counterfactual estimations for treated airports 
through the selection of appropriate controls and 2) to assess the heterogeneity of AT impacts 
at different airports. In order to avoid overfitting (see Abadie et al. 2015), a different set of 
possible control airports is selected for each treated airport. Overfitting can occur when the 
control group contains airports that are dissimilar to the treated airport in their main 
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characteristics and the counterfactual estimation is optimised based on artificially matched 
airports as a result of idiosyncratic variation in passenger numbers.  
Criteria employed in selecting control airports include: located in a country with no change in 
AT over the period; but otherwise similar characteristics to the specific treated airport. 
Similarity is considered in terms of passenger numbers at treated and control airports. An 
airport is not included in the possible control group of a treated airport if maximum passenger 
numbers (over the pre-AT period) at the treated airport were at least twice as large (or half as 
large) as those at the given control airport. Full details on treated airports and their controls 
are provided in the Appendix, along with the selected weighted averages used in order to 
create counterfactual passenger number series.  
Following Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), two sets of estimates are constructed for each 
treated airport: set A use control airports from countries surrounding Germany under the 
assumption that treated and control units are likely to face similar macroeconomic and 
regional shocks; while set B use a larger number of control airports from across the European 
Economic Area (EEA). The preferred results are those from whichever set of estimates 
provides the best fit for the pre-tax period (as in Ormaechea et al. 2017).  
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3.3 Covariate selection 
 
In our analysis, we include a number of covariates to control for factors affecting passenger 
trends at airports. The covariates included are: purchasing power per capita in euros (in 
constant prices) at the NUTS2 regional level, to control for the impact of macroeconomic 
shocks; lagged passenger numbers, to capture airport specific trends; and flight ticket price 
inflation in the country of the airport, to control for changes in ticket prices on the aggregate 
level. First-differences are also used to control for airport fixed effects. Annual data on 
passenger numbers using each airport over the period 2003-2015 are from Eurostat11. Data on 
purchasing power per capita, and flight ticket price inflation are also from Eurostat.  
 
3.4 Data restrictions 
 
To avoid biased estimates, we need to make restrictions to our data. Estimation bias could 
arise from including treated airports in the group of possible controls: under such 
circumstances counterfactual passenger numbers might also be affected by AT changes. 
Austrian airports are therefore excluded from the group of possible control airports, since 
Austria also introduced an AT in 2011. Furthermore, contrary to Falk and Hagsten (2018), we 
do not ‘treat’ Austrian airports and investigate their AT’s impact on passenger numbers. This 
is because the Austrian AT charged different rates from the German version of the tax – our 
preference is to keep the treatment homogenous so that we can assess the heterogeneity of 
treatment effects across airports and relate these differences to airport characteristics.  
In addition, the Netherlands introduced an AT in July 2008 but abolished it a year later. It is 
possible that some of the longer-term effects (see Zuidberg 2015) of the abolition of Dutch 
AT will coincide with the introduction of the German aviation tax – this is a limitation of our 
analysis12. Nonetheless, we do not exclude Dutch airports from the group of treated airports 
as they provide some of the best substitution opportunities for German passengers after the 
introduction of AT – if we observe substitution effects after AT these are likely to concern 
Dutch airports close to the German border. Furthermore, German AT was introduced more 
                                                             
11 These data concern both departing, arriving and transfer passengers, which is a limitation since that the tax is 
charged on departing passengers.  
12 This is a limitation for the estimations that concern Dutch airports. As Dutch airports are ‘treated’ and are 
therefore not in the control groups of other airports, estimations for other airports are unaffected by our decision 
to include them in the sample.  
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than a year after the abolition of Dutch AT, our estimations therefore likely capture most of 
the impact of the abolition on passenger numbers during this period.   
 
Figure 1. Map of Airports and Catchment Areas 
Note: German airports and catchment areas are shown in green; bordering airports/catchment areas in red; and 
points with no label indicate airports excluded from estimation. Information on airport codes can be found in 
Tables 2-3 in the Appendix.    
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4. Results  
 
The full synthetic control results are provided in the Appendix. Here we show results for two 
airports by way of examples.  Figures 2 and 3 plot actual and counterfactual (synthetic) 
passenger numbers for Amsterdam and Nuremberg respectively. The impact associated with 
the introduction of AT corresponds to the vertical difference (gap) between the actual and 
counterfactual time trends after 2010. The imposition of AT in 2011 is associated with 
increased passenger numbers relative to the counterfactual in the case of Amsterdam, and 
decreased numbers in the case of Nuremberg.  
Figures 2-3: Examples of Synthetic Control Estimates 
 
Amsterdam Nuremberg 
  
 
Figure 4 summarises the full set of results for the treated airports, by plotting the post-tax 
percentage deviations of actual passenger numbers as compared to the counterfactual. The 
plotted figures are each airport’s average percentage change in passenger numbers over the 
post-tax sample, i.e. 2011-2015, in each case.  
Recall from Section 2 that different airport types (specifically hubs as distinct from regional 
airports) might respond differently to the implementation of AT. For this reason, Figure 5 
provides a summary of the results grouped by (treated) airport type. Airports are designated 
as hubs based on their size and the airlines that use them as the centre for their operations and 
networks: the four largest German airports (Frankfurt Main, Munich, Berlin-Tegel and 
Dusseldorf) are obvious choices as they handle a significantly larger number of passengers in 
comparison to other airports and also serve as the hubs of a number of airlines. We include 
Hamburg Airport in the hub category as it serves a considerably larger number of passengers 
in comparison to the next busiest German airport (Cologne). All non-hub airports in Germany 
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are in the regional airports group, while bordering airports are in a separate group regardless 
of their size. Finally, we create a separate ‘low-cost’ airport group to assess whether airports 
serving predominantly low-cost airlines were impacted differently by the AT introduction. 
Low-cost airports are those airports where at least 50% of the services are provided by low-
cost airlines13. This category contains almost all German non-hub airports, with the exception 
of Stuttgart.  
  
                                                             
13 Information on services is collected from airport websites. This information is not available for previous years 
so 2018 data are used.  
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Figure 4. Post-Tax Deviations from Counterfactual Passenger Numbers (Treated Airports) 
 
Bordering airports are marked red.  
 
Figure 5. Post-Tax Deviations from Counterfactual Passenger Numbers – by Airport Type 
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Most German airports appear on the right of the Figure 4, indicating estimated losses of 
passengers since AT’s introduction. Most bordering airports, shown in red, made gains. A 
small number of German airports, notably Berlin Tegel, Dusseldorf and Munich saw gains in 
passenger numbers relative to the no tax counterfactual. In Figure 5, it is also clear that most 
regional airports in Germany (most of these airports serving low-cost airlines) lost passengers 
(in comparison the counterfactual scenario) since the introduction of AT.  
Aggregating the results shown in Figure 4 for German airports provides us with an estimate 
of 4 million passengers lost (annually) compared to the counterfactual scenario under the 
assumption of no AT.  This is roughly 2% of annual passenger numbers at these airports so 
indicates rather a small aggregate (net) effect on passenger demand at German airports.  
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4.1 On the plausibility of the findings 
 
To check the plausibility of our findings we: provide information on pre-AT fit of models; 
explore the sensitivity of results to the choice of control airports; and provide information on 
the significance of our estimates based on placebo tests.  
The fit of synthetic control models in the pre-AT period is measured using Root Mean 
Squared Prediction Errors (RMSPE) - constructed from the squared difference between actual 
and counterfactual passenger numbers for each pre-AT year, averaged across the available 
pre-tax years. The normalised RMSPE adjusts for airport size so is expressed as a % of that 
airport’s passenger numbers in 2010; a figure in excess of 5% is indicative of poor fit and 
signals that estimates of the impact of AT must then be treated with caution. 
The check on the sensitivity of results considers whether estimated impacts of AT are 
affected by the inclusion/exclusion of particular airports in the set of controls. Recall from 
Section 3.2, that we estimated separate synthetic control models for each treated airport using 
different sets of control airports (set A and set B)14. Similar estimated impacts from the two 
sets are indicative of robustness (see Table 1, column 2).  
Asymptotic inference is not possible using the synthetic control method. Inference on 
significance of estimated effects therefore comes from placebo tests, following Abadie et al. 
(2010). First the AT treatment is assigned to each control airport and impacts estimated. 
Since no AT was actually introduced for these airports we expect any estimated impacts to be 
small and random. Essentially, we have confidence in our results for treated airports if their 
estimated post-tax gaps are large relative to those generated in the placebo tests15.  
To evaluate this, we use RMSPE ratios to construct p-values. RMSPE ratios are measured as 
the post-tax gap (between actual and counterfactual passenger numbers) divided by the pre-
tax gap. These ratios indicate the extent to which post-tax gaps are large in comparison to the 
pre-tax fit of our counterfactuals. Each p-value then indicates the likelihood that a randomly 
selected RMSPE ratio from the sample of placebo tests is larger than that of the given treated 
airport. It is simply the number of RMSPE ratios from the placebo group that exceed the ratio 
for the treated airport, and divided by the number of control airports in the group. For 
                                                             
14 The synthetic control results presented in the Appendix show estimates from the set of controls that provides 
the better pre-AT fit. Figures showing results for estimations using the other set of control variables can be 
found in the Online Appendix (https://sites.google.com/view/danielborbely/research).    
15 Graphical representations of the placebo tests for each treated airport can be found in the Online Appendix.   
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example, if the treated airport’s RMSPE ratio is larger than the ratio for all of its control 
airports (say there are 50 of them), the p-value is going to be equal to 0/50 = 0.  
Significance can be interpreted as indicating that AT had an unusually large effect on a 
treated airport relative to the placebo effects for control airports. Recall though that inference 
must be predicated on well-fitting models that are reasonably robust to the choice of controls. 
Table 1 summarises our findings.  
Most of our airport estimates are based on synthetic control models that achieve a good fit 
prior to the introduction of AT and are robust. Some of these results are not significant 
however. This is likely a consequence of relatively small effects associated with AT at these 
airports (for example Frankfurt Main), or large idiosyncratic effects coinciding with AT at 
some of the control airports. As the results for these treated airports are robust and are based 
on reliable counterfactual estimations (good pre-AT fit), we should not reject them despite 
the lack of significance.  
In Table 1, airport results marked with shaded rows are based on ill-fitting synthetic control 
models. Counterfactual estimations for these airports are unreliable as counterfactual 
passenger numbers already substantially deviate from actual numbers before the introduction 
of AT. The small number of airports falling under this category tend to be small regional 
airports, with low annual passenger numbers. It is possible that passenger number changes at 
these airports are too idiosyncratic to be modelled appropriately. Since these airports serve 
very few airlines and destinations, a single airline changing routes or schedules might have a 
substantial impact on passenger numbers.  
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Table 1. Summary of Robustness/Inference Measures: 
 
Note: ***Significant at 1% level, **5%, *10%. The synthetic control model for a given airport is considered ill-fitting 
(marked with the shaded rows) when pre-estimation error (RMSPE) is higher than 5% of passenger numbers in 2010. The 
sample robustness check relies on the comparison of estimates that use different samples of control airports (see Section 
4.1).   
  
Airports  Pre-estimation 
error (% of 
passengers) 
Sample 
Robustness  
Check  
RMSPE 
Ratio 
p-value  
German hubs 
Berlin Tegel  3.60 ✓ 4.61 0.273 
Dusseldorf  1.49 ✓ 2.92  0.700 
Frankfurt Main 0.53 ✓ 2.17 0.818 
Hamburg  1.62 ✓ 4.16 0.706 
Munich  0.53 ✓ 24.56 0.000*** 
German regional airports 
Berlin Schonefeld  5.89 ✓ 1.75 0.682 
Bremen  2.44 ✓ 12.91 0.032** 
Cologne 0.61 ✓ 27.17 0.000*** 
Dortmund 3.65 ✓ 1.45 0.914 
Dresden 0.55 ✓ 37.49 0.000*** 
Erfurt  16.68 ✓ 1.58 0.726 
Frankfurt Hahn  4.11 ✓ 11.23 0.076* 
Friedrichshafen  2.07 ✓ 3.71 0.313 
Hannover  4.00 ✓ 6.17 0.238 
Karlsruhe  5.83 ✓ 4.55 0.600 
Leipzig  2.62 ✓ 9.07 0.152 
Munster  1.33 ✓ 33.15 0.000*** 
Nuremberg  0.81 ✓ 43.62 0.000*** 
Paderborn  6.02 ✓ 5.95 0.393 
Saarbrucken  7.88 ✓ 1.26 0.813 
Stuttgart   1.37 ✓ 4.19 0.474 
Bordering airports 
Amsterdam  0.68 ✓ 22.13 0.000*** 
Basel  3.93 ✓ 10.36 0.038** 
Billund  3.41 ✓ 8.32 0.111 
Brussels  1.53 ✓ 4.26 0.818 
Charleroi  6.59 ✓ 4.49 0.300 
Eindhoven  4.77 ✓ 169.09 0.000*** 
Luxembourg  2.80 ✓ 11.71 0.057* 
Maastricht  18.32 ✓ 1.97 0.643 
Metz  5.32 ✓ 1.48 0.867 
Prague  1.99 ✓ 10.76 0.143 
Rotterdam  8.71 ✓ 2.91 0.733 
Szczecin  10.71 ✓ 1.52 0.714 
Zurich  3.02 ✓ 3.06 0.636 
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5. Discussion  
 
The findings set out in Section 4 are consistent with the likely behavioural responses of 
agents to increases in AT.  
a) That bordering airports are estimated to have benefited from AT is consistent with 
passengers substituting to alternative airports to avoid ticket prices that incorporate 
AT. Such effects will be strongest when German and non-German airport catchment 
areas overlap (for example in the case of Eindhoven – EIN or Basel - BSL, see Figure 
1). Our findings of sizable substitution effects at most bordering airports contrast with 
Falk and Hagsten (2018), who find no significant impact on bordering airports from 
German and Austrian AT using a panel diff-in-diff approach. It is possible that 
differences in results arise from methodological differences: while our approach 
allows us to observe airport-specific treatment effects at each bordering airport, in 
Falk and Hagsten (2018) bordering airports are pooled together in the panel diff-in-
diff analysis potentially allowing outlier airports (where AT had no effect or a 
negative effect) to put a downward bias on the overall treatment effect. Outliers are 
also present in our sample: in the case of two bordering airports (Szczecin and 
Prague) decreased passenger numbers can be associated with the introduction of AT. 
A likely explanation for the lack of a substitution towards these airports is that, for 
one reason or another, they do not offer a viable alternative to nearby German 
airports: for example, road or rail links from Germany to these airports might not be 
appropriate; or the airports offer different services to German counterparts. 
Nonetheless, the large negative impact observed for Prague Airport is difficult to 
explain and is likely a consequence of some exogenous shock to passenger numbers 
we could not account for in our synthetic control estimations.  
b) It is possible that the response of airlines, especially low-cost ones, have exacerbated 
the impact of AT on passenger numbers. Anecdotal evidence from the Dutch and 
German AT cases point to some airlines having responded to an anticipated drop in 
demand by relocating their services to airports outside the AT area (Zuidberg 2015). 
As mentioned in Section 2, such responses ought to be strongest among budget 
airlines, since they are less tied to hubs and able to relocate quickly. Of course, the 
elimination of some destinations from regional airports forces travellers to shift their 
custom elsewhere. Our estimates are consistent with these explanations: smaller, 
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regional airports (predominantly serving low-cost airlines) lost proportionately more 
passengers after the introduction of AT (see Figure 5). In fact, nearly all airports 
shown on the right side of Figure 4 - airports with the largest losses in passenger 
numbers from AT - fall under this category16. In this respect our findings are in line 
with those of Falk and Hagsten (2018).  
c) Estimates for hub airports within Germany either show small negative effects 
(Hamburg) or positive impacts of AT (Berlin Tegel, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt Main and 
Munich). The greater resilience of passenger numbers at airline hubs facing AT is 
consistent with a lower price elasticity of demand. A likely explanation is that hubs 
attract a greater proportion of passengers flying on business trips, see Hess and Polak 
(2005); greater proportion of untaxed transfer passengers; fewer offerings from 
budget airlines; fewer opportunities to substitute to non-taxed routes, and a greater 
attachment of non-budget airlines to particular hubs (which reduces the supply side 
response). It is also possible that hubs within Germany gain passengers who substitute 
away from budget airlines once the latter airlines reduce their flights from German 
regional airports and from substitution induced by the relatively larger proportionate 
change in budget airline’s ticket prices (assuming pass-on), since the AT due varies 
only by distance, not by service level.  
d) While our analysis does not explicitly focus on policy outcomes, it is possible to draw 
some policy implications from our results. Recall from Section 1 that the main 
objectives of governments who implement ATs are: 1) to reduce the environmental 
burden of the aviation industry and 2) revenue raising.  
From an environmental perspective, the reduction in air travel demand in Germany 
could act to reduce pollution levels, however the fact that some of the demand 
relocates to bordering airports mitigates the potential for an overall reduction in 
pollution levels. It is also possible that the observed changes in travel demand at hubs 
vs regional airports will lead to a larger share of passengers taking long-haul flights 
which results in greater pollution (see Mayor and Tol 2007). The cross-border 
substitution effect found in our analysis also provides evidence in support of the 
argument that, in order to successfully curb emissions from air travel, a harmonised 
EU-wide aviation tax is needed (Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2017). As long as AT 
                                                             
16 Results for the two outliers, namely Berlin Schonefeld and Saarbrucken are based on ill-fitting synthetic 
control models.  
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rates are allowed to vary between neighbouring countries, tax avoidance through 
cross-border substitution will remain a salient option for mobile passengers, leading 
only to a relocation of air travel demand and a reduction in the intended positive 
environmental impact of aviation taxes (Leicester and O’Dea 2008).  
From a tax-revenue perspective, the substitution effect observed at bordering airports 
leads to lost tax revenues as passengers substitute to airports where they can avoid 
paying AT. In Section 4, we estimated that 4 million passengers were lost annually for 
German airports; assuming that half of these were departing (taxed) passengers and 
multiplying with the estimated average unit tax of €12.26, we estimate the annual loss 
in tax revenues to be approximately €24.52 million, or 2.45 percent of expected 
government revenues from AT (see Section 2). On the other hand, increased traffic at 
hub airports, with a higher share of business/long-haul passengers paying higher rates 
of AT, likely has a positive impact on average tax paid and consequently on tax 
revenues. Overall, the German airports included in our sample had roughly 203.9 
million annual passengers combined in the post-AT years (on average); if half of 
these passengers were taxed, estimated tax revenues from AT amount to 
approximately €1.25 billion annually, slightly exceeding the policy target set by the 
German government.  
Regardless, considering the dual objectives of the policy, in an ideal scenario AT 
should curb overall air travel demand (to reduce emissions), without a cross-border 
substitution effect that results in the loss of the tax base. Our results provide evidence 
to the contrary: German demand, and overall air travel demand, is not reduced to a 
large extent, but the cross-border effect is substantial. Please note, however, that our 
tax revenue estimations are based on back-of-the-envelope type calculations, as 
information on the number of departing passengers (the composition of the tax base) 
in each AT band is not available for the purposes of this research. To appropriately 
assess the impact of behavioural responses on policy outcomes, further analysis is 
needed at a more disaggregated level.  
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6. Conclusions  
 
The synthetic control approach has provided estimates of the effects of German AT on 
passenger numbers using German airports and airports outside Germany but near the border.  
Estimates indicate that AT has significantly reduced passenger numbers, relative to the 
counterfactual of zero AT, for many German airports, though passenger numbers tended to 
hold up at and even grow somewhat at some hub airports. At the same time, most bordering 
airports gained passenger numbers. These findings are consistent with likely and mutually 
reinforcing behavioural responses of passengers and airlines to AT and the induced changes 
in the relative prices of airline services. From a policy perspective, these behavioural 
responses can have ambiguous impacts on both the environmental and revenue-raising 
objectives associated with AT. This paper also provides a methodological contribution to the 
literature on aviation taxes: future research on aviation taxes, for example studies focusing on 
the ATs recently introduced in Norway and Sweden, could make use of the synthetic control 
approach to estimate the impact of these taxes on a variety of outcomes.  
Our analysis has a number of notable limitations. In our estimations, we are unable to 
explicitly model the impacts of substitute forms of transportation on German (and bordering) 
airports17. For example, the deregulation of long-distance bus services in Germany in 2013 
has led to a large increase in intra-urban bus traffic within the country (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt 
2016). It is possible that this had an effect on passenger numbers at some of the regional 
airports that offer domestic flights. In addition, we do not model tourism related factors that 
might drive (inbound) demand for air travel. For example, Germany reduced the VAT on 
hotel accommodation from 19% to 7% in 2010 (see European Commission, VAT database) 
which might have had a positive impact on the demand for inbound air travel. Finally, an 
additional limitation is that the use of aggregate data does not allow us to distinguish between 
the behavioural responses of different passenger types (leisure/business, short-haul/long-haul) 
and prohibits the estimation of tax revenues from AT. Future research, using more detailed 
micro-data on passengers, is needed to disentangle behavioural responses and provide an 
accurate assessment of tax revenue considerations.   
                                                             
17 For example, there does not seem to be consistent data available on the number of bus passengers in European 
countries over our sample period. Eurostat has data on this for some countries but not others (German data are 
not available).   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  St. Dev  Min Max 
Passenger 
numbers (000s)  
6656.043 11954.955 24.65 75017.52 
Annual % change 
in passenger 
numbers  
5.47 18.45 -57.78 226.03 
Ln (PP per capita) 10.17 0.381 8.748 11.24 
Average annual 
change in ln (PP)  
0.207 0.450 -0.192 0.202 
Average annual 
flight ticket price 
inflation  
1.663 1.432 -1.640 12.06 
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Table 2. Treated Airports, Control Airports, and Synthetic Control Weights – German 
Airports 
Treated Airport (Airport Code) Control Airports (SC weights)  
Nuremberg (NUE) Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Faro, Gdansk, Girona, Goteborg (0.251), 
Heraklion, Ibiza, Kerkira, Kos, Larnaka, Malmo (0.242), Marseille, Menorca, Nantes 
(0.027), Pafos, Porto, Riga, Rodos, Santiago, Sevilla (0.035), Sofia, Stockholm, Stockholm 
B (0.044), Tallin, Thessaloniki, Toulouse (0.332), Valencia (0.068), Vilnius, Wroclaw    
Leipzig (LEJ) Asturias, Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Gdansk, Girona, Jerez, Kerkira, 
Kos, Larnaka, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, Montpellier, Murcia, Nantes, Pafos, 
Reus, Riga, Rodos, Santander (0.037), Santiago, Santorini, Sevilla, Sofia, Stockholm, 
Stockholm B (0.613), Strasbourg, Tallin, Thessaloniki (0.285), Valencia (0.065), Varna, 
Vilnius, Wroclaw  
Munich (MUC) Barcelona, Copenhagen, Geneva (0.521), London H, Madrid (0.275), Paris Orly, Palma, 
Paris CDG (0.152), Stockholm Main (0.052)  
Frankfurt Main (FRA) Athens, Barcelona (0.203), Copenhagen, Helsinki, Lisboa, London H (0.606), Madrid, 
Paris Orly, Palma, Paris CDG (0.071), Stockholm Main (0.12)  
Berlin-Tegel (TXL) Alicante (0.141), Athens, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Geneva, Helsinki, Lisboa (0.781), Nice, 
Paris Orly (0.079), Palma, Stockholm Main  
Cologne (CGN) Alicante, Athens, Bordeaux, Budapest (0.417), Faro, Goteborg (0.025), Helsinki (0.216), 
Heraklion, Ibiza, Larnaka, Lyon, Malaga (0.186), Marseille (0.047), Nice (0.096), Porto 
(0.013), Riga, Thessaloniki, Toulouse (0.001), Valencia  
Dortmund (DTM) Aalborg, Almeria, Asturias, Bastia, Bilbao (0.113), Bratislava (0.177), Burgas, Chania, 
Coruna, Gdansk, Granada, Jerez, Kerkira, Kos, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, 
Montpellier, Murcia (0.391), Nantes, Pafos, Reus, Rodos, Santiago, Santorini, Sofia, 
Stockholm, Stockholm B, Tallin, Timisoara, Varna, Vigo, Vilnius (0.318) 
Hamburg (HAM) Alicante, Athens, Budapest (0.116), Copenhagen, Geneva, Helsinki (0.72), Lisboa (0.15), 
Lyon, Malaga, Marseille, Nice, Paris Orly, Palma (0.014), Porto, Stockholm Main  
Dusseldorf (DUS) Athens, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Geneva (0.082), Helsinki, Lisboa (0.603), Malaga, Nice, 
Paris Orly (0.314), Palma, Stockholm Main  
Munster (FMO) Aalborg, Almeria (0.131), Asturias, Bastia, Biarritz, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Coruna, 
Granada, Jerez, Kerkira, Kos, Lille, Ljubljana (0.199), Malmo (0.23), Menorca (0.07), 
Montpellier (0.369), Murcia, Pafos, Reus, Santiago, Santorini, Stockholm, Stockholm B, 
Tallin, Timisoara, Varna, Vigo, Wroclaw  
Bremen (BRE) Aalborg, Almeria, Asturias, Bastia (0.517), Biarritz, Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, 
Chania, Coruna, Gdansk, Girona, Goteborg, Granada, Heraklion, Ibiza, Jerez, Kerkira, 
Kos, Larnaka (0.003), Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, Murcia, Nantes, Pafos, Porto 
(0.407), Reus, Riga, Rodos, Santorini, Sevilla, Sofia, Stockholm B, Tallin, Thessaloniki, 
Timisoara, Varna, Vigo, Vilnius, Wroclaw (0.073), Zakintos  
Frankfurt Hahn (HHN)  Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Faro, Gdansk (0.259), Girona, Goteborg, 
Heraklion (0.208), Ibiza, Kerkira, Kos, Larnaka, Malmo, Menorca, Nantes, Pafos, Porto, 
Riga (0.053), Rodos (0.267), Santiago, Sevilla, Sofia, Stockholm, Stockholm B, Tallin, 
Thessaloniki, Toulouse, Valencia (0.212)   
Stuttgart (STR) Alicante, Athens, Bordeaux, Budapest (0.22), Faro, Goteborg (0.212), Helsinki, Heraklion, 
Ibiza, Larnaka, Lisboa, Lyon, Malaga (0.448), Marseille, Nice, Porto (0.12), Thessaloniki, 
Toulouse, Valencia  
Paderborn (PAD) Aalborg, Almeria (0.262), Asturias, Bastia, Biarritz, Bratislava, Burgas, Coruna, Granada, 
Jerez, Kerkira, Kos, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Montpellier (0.61), Murcia, Pafos, Reus, 
Santiago, Santorini, Stockholm B, Tallin, Timisoara, Varna, Vigo, Wroclaw, Zakintos 
(0.128), Zaragoza 
Berlin Schonefeld (SXF) Alicante, Bordeaux, Budapest, Faro, Goteborg, Helsinki, Heraklion, Ibiza, Larnaka, Lyon, 
Malaga, Marseille, Nantes, Nice, Porto (0.311), Riga (0.568), Rodos, Sevilla (0.121), 
Thessaloniki, Toulouse, Valencia  
Dresden (DRS) Aalborg, Almeria, Asturias, Bastia (0.051), Biarritz, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Coruna, 
Gdansk (0.065), Granada, Jerez, Kerkira, Kos, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo (0.109), Menorca 
(0.152), Montpellier, Murcia, Pafos (0.492), Reus, Santiago (0.09), Santorini, Stockholm 
(0.032), Stockholm B, Tallin, Timisoara, Varna, Vigo, Vilnius (0.009), Wroclaw, Zakintos  
Karlsruhe (FKB) Aalborg, Almeria, Asturias, Bastia, Biarritz, Bratislava, Burgas, Coruna, Granada, Jerez, 
Kerkira, Kos, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Montpellier, Murcia, Pafos, Reus, Santiago, 
Santorini, Stockholm B, Tallin, Timisoara, Varna, Vigo, Wroclaw (0.613), Zakintos, 
Zaragoza (0.387)  
Erfurt (ERF) Aarhus (0.247), Beziers, Brno, Chios (0.753), Kalamata, Karup, Kavala, Kefallania, 
Ostrava, Preveza, Samos, Skiathos, Zaragoza 
Friedrichshafen (FDH) Aarhus, Alexandropoulos, Almeria (0.171), Bastia, Biarritz (0.241), Brno (0.022), Coruna, 
Kavala, Kefallania (0.516), Preveza, Samos, Skiathos, Timisoara (0.516) Zaragoza 
Hannover (HAJ) Alicante (0.3), Bilbao, Bordeaux, Faro, Gdansk, Girona, Goteborg (0.7), Heraklion, Ibiza, 
Larnaka, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, Porto, Riga, Sevilla, Sofia, Thessaloniki, Toulouse, 
Valencia, Vilnius  
Saarbrucken (SCN) Aarhus (0.2692), Beziers (0.308), Brno, Chios, Kalamata, Karup, Kavala, Kefallania, 
Ostrava, Preveza, Samos, Skiathos, Zaragoza 
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Table 3. Treated Airports, Control Airports, and Synthetic Control Weights – Bordering 
Airports 
Treated Airport Control Airports (SC weights)  
Amsterdam (AMS) Barcelona (0.441), Copenhagen, Geneva, Helsinki, Lisboa, London H (0.319), Madrid, 
Palma, Paris Orly, Paris CDG (0.178), Stockholm Main (0.062)  
Eindhoven (EIN) Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Faro, Gdansk, Goteborg, Heraklion, Ibiza, 
Kerkira, Kos, Larnaka, Lyon, Marseille, Menorca, Nantes, Pafos, Porto, Riga, Rodos, 
Santiago (0.067), Sevilla, Sofia, Stockholm (0.253), Stockholm B, Tallin, Thessaloniki, 
Toulouse, Valencia, Vilnius, Wroclaw (0.68)  
Rotterdam (RTM) Aalborg (0.209), Almeria, Asturias, Bastia, Biarritz, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Coruna, 
Granada, Jerez, Kerkira, Kos, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, Montpellier, Murcia, 
Pafos, Reus, Santiago (0.053), Santorini, Stockholm, Stockholm B, Tallin, Timisoara, 
Varna, Vigo, Wroclaw, Zakintos (0.737)  
Maastricht (MST) Aarhus, Alexandropoulos, Beziers (0.254), Brno, Chios, Kalamata, Karup, Kavala, 
Kefallania, Nimes (0.746), Ostrava, Preveza, Samos, Skiathos, Zaragoza 
Basel (BSL) Alicante, Bilbao, Bordeaux, Budapest, Faro, Gdansk (0.51), Goteborg, Heraklion, Ibiza, 
Larnaka, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, Nice, Porto, Prague, Riga (0.153), Rodos, Sevilla, Sofia, 
Thessaloniki, Toulouse, Valencia (0.337), Vilnius  
Luxembourg (LUX)  Aalborg, Asturias, Bilbao, Bordeaux (0.024), Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Gdansk, 
Granada, Jerez, Kerkira, Kos (0.071), Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, Montpellier 
(0.692), Murcia, Nantes, Pafos, Reus, Riga, Rodos, Santiago, Santorini, Sevilla, Sofia, 
Stockholm (0.213), Stockholm B, Tallin, Varna, Vigo, Vilnius, Wroclaw  
Billund (BLL) Asturias, Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, Gdansk, Granada, Jerez, Kerkira, 
Kos, Larnaka (0.056), Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, Montpellier (0.532), Murcia, 
Nantes, Pafos, Reus, Riga, Rodos, Santiago (0.163), Santorini, Sevilla, Sofia, Stockholm 
(0.11), Stockholm B, Tallin, Thessaloniki, Varna, Vilnius (0.139), Wroclaw  
Brussels (BRU) Athens, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Geneva (0.209), Helsinki, Lisboa, Malaga, Nice (0.437), 
Paris Orly (0.355), Palma, Stockholm M  
Zurich (ZRH) Athens, Barcelona, Copenhagen (0.39), Geneva, Helsinki, Lisboa (0.436), Madrid (0.174), 
Malaga, Paris Orly, Palma, Stockholm Main  
Metz (ETZ) Aarhus (0.284), Alexandropoulos, Beziers, Brno, Chios, Esbjerg (0.628), Kalamata, 
Karpathos, Karup, Kavala, Kefallinia, Ostrava, Preveza, Samos (0.088), Skiathos  
Szczecin (SZZ) Aarhus, Alexandropoulos, Beziers (0.469), Brno (0.531), Chambery, Chios, Kalamata, 
Karpathos, Karup, Kavala, Kefallinia, La Rochelle, Nimes, Preveza, Samos, Skiathos  
Prague (PRG) Alicante, Athens, Budapest (0.637), Faro, Geneva (0.363), Helsinki, Ibiza, Lisboa, Lyon, 
Malaga, Marseille, Nice, Palma, Porto, Stockholm Main  
Charleroi (CRL) Aalborg, Almeria, Asturias, Bastia (0.34), Biarritz, Bordeaux, Bratislava, Burgas, Chania, 
Coruna, Faro (0.005), Gdansk (0.218), Girona, Goteborg, Granada, Heraklion (0.176), 
Jerez, Kerkira, Kos, Larnaka, Lille, Ljubljana, Malmo, Menorca, Murcia, Pafos, Porto 
(0.529), Reus, Riga (0.13), Rodos, Santiago, Sevilla, Sofia, Stockholm B, Tallin, 
Thessaloniki, Varna, Vigo, Vilnius, Wroclaw    
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Synthetic Control Estimations  
 
Figures 1-2: Amsterdam and Basel   
  
Figures 3-4: Berlin Schonefeld and Billund   
  
Figures 5-6: Bremen and Brussels    
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Figures 7-8: Berlin-Tegel and Charleroi  
  
Figures 9-10: Cologne and Dortmund   
  
Figures 11-12: Dresden and Dusseldorf   
  
Figures 13-14: Eindhoven and Erfurt     
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Figures 15-16: Friedrichshafen and Frankfurt Main  
  
Figures 17-18: Frankfurt Hahn and Hamburg   
  
Figures 19-20: Hannover and Karlsruhe    
  
Figures 21-22: Luxembourg and Leipzig    
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Figures 23-24: Maastricht and Metz   
  
Figures 25-26: Munich and Munster    
  
Figures 27-28: Nuremberg and Paderborn   
  
Figures 29-30: Prague and Rotterdam     
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Figures 31-32: Saarbrucken and Stuttgart  
  
Figures 33-34: Szczecin and Zurich  
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